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Abstract The paper briefly summarises and critiques Tomasello’s (2014) A Nat-
ural History of Human Thinking. After offering an overview of the book, the paper
focusses on one particular part of Tomasello’s proposal on the evolution of uniquely
human thinking and raises two points of criticism against it. One of them concerns
his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical findings on egocentric biases
in communication.
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There is evidence that a number of non-human animals, ranging from corvids,
domestic pigs, and dolphins to great apes, are capable of high-level thinking that is
in many ways familiar from that in our own species (see, e.g. Taylor 2014; Marino
and Colvin 2015; Herzing and Johnson 2015; Osvath and Martin-Ordas 2014). If
that is so, what makes human thinking unique and what explains its origin?
In his recent book A Natural History of Human Thinking, Michael Tomasello sets
out to offer answers to these questions. In what follows, I briefly summarise and
critique the book.
I begin by clarifying what Tomasello means by ‘human thinking’ (‘‘The notion of
human thinking’’ section), before outlining the overall argument of the book
(‘‘Overview of A Natural History of Human Thinking’’ section). After that, I hone in
on one particular part of Tomasello’s proposal on the evolution of uniquely human
thinking and raise two points of criticism against it (‘‘Critical discussion’’ section).
One of them concerns his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical
findings on egocentric biases in communication.
& Uwe Peters
uwe.peters@kcl.ac.uk
1 King’s College London, London, UK
123
Biol Philos (2016) 31:299–312
DOI 10.1007/s10539-015-9512-0
The notion of human thinking
In A Natural History of Human Thinking, Tomasello’s goal is to offer an account of
the unique nature and origin of human thinking. To specify what he means by
‘thinking’, Tomasello appeals to dual-process theory. He writes that although
humans and other animals solve many problems and make many decisions
based on evolved intuitive heuristics (so-called system 1 processes), humans
and at least some other animals also solve some problems and make some
decisions by thinking (system 2 processes; e.g. Kahneman 2011). (2014: 4)
In Kahneman’s (2011) dual-process account, which Tomasello here endorses,
system 1 processes are inter alia automatic and unconscious, i.e. working-memory
independent processes, whereas system 2 processes are inter alia subject-controlled
and conscious, i.e. working-memory dependent in nature (see Kahneman 2011: 18,
22, 25, 308). Given this, for Tomasello, thinking is a subject-controlled, conscious
process.
More specifically, he holds that thinking is a single such process with three key
components: ‘‘(1) the ability to cognitively represent experiences to oneself ‘off-
line’; (2) the ability to simulate or make inferences transforming these represen-
tations causally, intentionally and/or logically; and (3) the ability to self-monitor
and evaluate how these simulated experiences might lead to specific behavioural
outcomes’’ (2014: 4).
Turning from thinking in general to human thinking, in particular, Tomasello
holds that with respect to (1) to (3), unlike other animals, ‘‘only humans’’ are able to
(i) cognitively represent and conceptualise identical situations or entities under
‘‘differing, possibly conflicting social perspectives (leading ultimately to a notion of
‘objectivity’)’’, (ii) ‘‘make socially recursive and self-reflective inferences about
others’ or their own intentional states’’, and (iii) ‘‘self-monitor and evaluate their
own thinking with respect to the normative perspectives and standards (‘reasons’) of
others or the group’’ (ibid).
Tomasello calls the uniquely human thinking characterised by (i)-(iii) ‘‘objec-
tive-reflective-normative thinking’’ (ibid). His aim in A Natural History of Human
Thinking is to offer an evolutionary explanation of how objective-reflective-
normative thinking could emerge from the kind of thinking that humans share with
non-human animals.
Overview of A Natural History of Human Thinking
Tomasello calls the thinking that we share with non-human animals ‘‘individual
intentionality’’ (2014: 4). Individual intentionality is what an animal exhibits if it
cognitively represents experiences to itself ‘off-line’, simulates or makes inferences
involving these representations, and self-monitors and assesses how these simulated
experiences might lead to specific results so as to make an instrumentally rational
decision on what to do to satisfy its own desires (Tomasello 2014: 9).
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Tomasello mentions a number of studies that show that, e.g. great apes display
individual intentionality. They are able to use cognitive representations of their
physical surrounding for causal inferences, represent another agent’s intentional
states, and employ the representation to make inferences pertaining to how the
individual will act given the mental state she is in. Great apes also monitor their own
cognition: based on their certainty about what they know, they assess their chances
of success at a task and make decisions accordingly. Great ape thinking, which
Tomasello takes to correspond to the thinking in our last non-human ancestors from
5 to 6 million years ago, is hence already relatively sophisticated.
It is, however, only geared toward the satisfaction of the animal’s own
individualistic needs when it is competing with group mates for valued resources,
Tomasello writes. He holds that great apes’ individual intentionality is only self-
focussed ‘‘cognition for competition’’ of typically lone-acting creatures (2014: 31).
According to the ‘‘shared intentionality hypothesis’’ that Tomasello sets out to
defend in A Natural History of Human Thinking, uniquely human thinking evolved
from this self-focussed, individual intentionality as an adaptation for ‘‘dealing with
problems of social coordination, specifically, problems presented by individuals’
attempts to collaborate and communicate with others’’ (2014: 4). He write that this
evolution happened in two steps, one leading from individual to ‘‘joint intention-
ality’’ and the other from joint intentionality to ‘‘collective intentionality’’, both of
which are for Tomasello instances of human-unique ‘‘shared intentionality’’ (2014:
5–6).
The first evolutionary step occurred about 400,000 years ago, in early humans
(the Homo heidelbergensis). Tomasello write that while humans’ great ape
ancestors lived, just as contemporary great apes, mostly individualistic and
competitive lives in which individual intentionality served them just fine, early
humans could no longer survive without collaborating with each other in dyadic
units when out foraging. The result was a species-unique selection for and evolution
of skills and motivations to engage in cooperative activities, which relied on a
‘‘dual-level structure’’ consisting of ‘‘joint goals’’ i.e. goals that both interactants
shared and knew they shared with each other—and ‘‘joint attention’’ i.e. both
interactants were attending to the same thing and knew they both did—forming a
‘‘joint intentionality’’ of the moment (Tomasello 2014: 33, 38).
Since the different individuals involved in cooperative activities with this
structure still retained different perspectives and had to play different roles for both
to achieve success in joint tasks, the need for early humans to coordinate their
actions and attention referentially on external situations and entities arose.
Tomasello argues that this initiated the evolution of new forms of communication
such as pointing, pantomiming, and iconic gestures via which interactants now
started to inform the other of aspects of the environment relevant for her/him to
achieve the joint goal.
These new forms of communication and collaboration in turn led to new forms of
thinking. For instance, in early humans’ cooperative communication, both the
communicator of a message and the recipient had to ‘‘anticipate’’, Tomasello writes,
the ‘‘perspective of their partner, which required socially recursive inferences that
embedded the intentional states of one partner within those of the other’’ (2014: 72).
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Individuals had to ‘‘think about their communicative partner thinking about their
thinking’’ because the communicator had to determine how best to convey to the
recipient her intention, and the recipient had to reconstruct the communicator’s
intention by appealing to what she wanted him to know, Tomasello maintains
(2014: 59).
Furthermore, early humans’ collaborative activities involved partner choice. This
meant that each individual developed an interest in being viewed as a good
collaborator, for bad collaborators weren’t chosen as partners in foraging activities
and hence ultimately faced starvation. Tomasello holds that each individual thus
began to monitor and control her own acting and thinking with the other’s
perspectives and evaluations in mind.
Still, early humans’ thinking was socially normative only in the sense that they
were concerned with how their particular collaborative partner, rather than the
group as a whole, assessed their cooperation and understood their communicative
acts. Early humans didn’t yet subject themselves to any ‘objective’ normative
standard of the group as a whole. Their thinking was thus ‘‘perspectival-recursive-
socially monitored thinking’’, but not yet objective-reflective-normative thinking
(Tomasello 2014: 79). For the latter to enter the scene, second-personal, joint
intentionality had to become ‘‘collective intentionality’’, Tomasello writes (ibid).
In his account of the transition, the social groups that early humans formed were
only loose pools of individuals for ad hoc dyadic collaborations. Two demographic
factors changed this. First, competition with other human groups emerged. In order
to protect their way of life from invaders, the unsteady social pools of early humans
were thus forced to become uniform collaborator groups with the shared goal of
group survival. Second, when human populations grew, smaller groupings that were
still part of a culture separated from the rest. As a result, members of a particular
group now encountered the problem of identifying individuals belonging to them.
Tomasello holds that in response to these two problems, modern humans started
developing a group identity, demarcating the ‘we’ from the ‘them’, the competitor
groups (2014: 82f). In order to enable the recognition of and coordination with in-
group strangers with whom one had no personal common ground, local practices
were conventionalised and became to function as shibboleths via which members of
the group could be easily identified. Conventionalised practices as well as social
norms and institutions to which each group member conformed and expected all
others to conform then constituted a cultural common ground that provided the basis
for collaboration with in-group strangers.
To further strengthen conformity and facilitate collaborations within the group,
early humans’ iconic gestures became substituted with linguistic conventions,
which, unlike early humans’ gestures, supported arbitrary connections between
signs and referents allowing for abstract conceptualisations, Tomasello writes. Since
the linguistic conventions were passed on to the next generation, the children of the
group didn’t have to reinvent conceptualisations but inherited from their social
environment various different ways of classifying the world for themselves and
others. They learned to view the same situation and entity simultaneously under
different guises, e.g. as an antelope by the tree, as an animal by the tree, as food by
the tree, etc. This knowledge, accumulated over time in the social environment via
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reliable teaching and learning mechanisms, introduced inter alia the possibility for
formal inferences as opposed to merely causal ones, for subjects could now think
that given that there is, say, an antelope by the tree, there is an animal (or food) by
the tree.
In addition, to be a good partner in collaborations, cooperative argumentation,
and shared decision-making, which was vital for survival, individuals now also
often had to make explicit in language their own attitudes toward particular contents
(e.g. whether they were certain or doubtful about a proposition) and the reasons for
their claims. To ensure the intelligibility and rationality of those linguistic acts and
reasons, modern humans needed to simulate in advance the cultural group’s
normative judgments of the intelligibility and rationality of the communicative acts
and reasons in order to align them with the group’s standards.
In their self-reflection and self-monitoring, humans now referred to the normative
perspective of all users of the linguistic conventions. For each of them took it that to
be a member of the group, one must behave as the group as a whole does, i.e. follow
the norms to which all are committed, or else be ostracised. Modern humans thus
referred in their thinking and action planning to the ‘‘agent-neutral’’, ‘‘‘objective’
perspective engendered’’ by their ‘‘cultural world’’ that then ‘‘justified personal
judgments of true and false, right and wrong’’ (2014: 115). The collaboration and
communication in modern humans were hence characterised by collective rather
than merely second-personal, joint intentionality. They led to the evolution of
reflective, ‘objective’, and normative, i.e. uniquely human thinking, Tomasello
writes.
He ends the main discussion in his book by emphasising that skills of shared
intentionality, e.g. the ability to engage in joint attention and form joint goals, are
not innate but biological adaptations that come into being during ontogeny as the
individual uses them to collaborate and communicate with others. This means that
without social interactions during childhood, and without collectively created and
transmitted cultural environments, including adults and all their cultural equipment
(e.g. language), joint and collective intentionality won’t develop. As a result,
uniquely human thinking won’t emerge either, Tomasello concludes.
Critical discussion
The central argument of Tomasello’s book that uniquely human thinking evolved
from individual intentionality in two steps that crucially involved a human-unique
form of cooperation is illuminating and plausible. Overall A Natural History of
Human Thinking is clearly written and a rewarding reading for anyone interested in
the evolution of human cognition. The book fills an important gap in the literature
by offering an empirically and theoretically well-supported account of the evolution
of a very specific aspect of human cognition, i.e. objective-reflective-normative
thinking, and its link to uniquely human cooperation.
While I’m largely sympathetic to Tomasello’s shared intentionality proposal, I
have reservations about some of the details. I will focus only on his story about the
evolution of one particular component of ‘‘objective-reflective-normative thinking’’,
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namely subjects’ ‘‘socially recursive and self-reflective inferences about others’ or
their own intentional states’’ (2014: 4). I will ignore the objective and normative
aspects that Tomasello takes to be part of uniquely human thinking.
Explicit versus implicit thinking
It is a common view that reading other people’s minds and engaging in socially
recursive thinking evolved in competitive social worlds for Machiavellian purposes,
i.e. for the purpose of or for guarding against deception and manipulation (Byrne
and Whiten 1988, 1997). Tomasello argues for a different proposal. He claims that
socially recursive thinking evolved because it was required for cooperative
communication.
One kind of study that he mentions to support this involves the object-choice task
(see Behne et al. 2005, 2012). For instance, if in interacting with a chimpanzee, the
experimenter points to food on the ground, the chimp will follow the pointing and
take the food. If the food is hidden in one of two buckets, however, and the
experimenter then points to either of them, the chimp will look to the bucket but
won’t make the inference that this is where the food is. Chimpanzees hence fail in
the object-choice task to find the food. In contrast, in the same kind of setting,
already 12-months old human infants immediately comprehend the informative
motive underlying the adult’s pointing, and know that the pointed-to bucket is the
one containing the sought-after object (Tomasello 2014: 52).
How are they able to know this? Tomasello argues that in the successful
performance ‘‘in the object choice task […] the recipient [of the message] infers that
the communicator intends that she know that the food is in the bucket—a socially
recursive inference that great apes apparently do not make’’1 (2014: 57). The
inference at issue, Tomasello writes, ‘‘requires in all cases an abductive leap’’ such
as: ‘‘his pointing in the direction of that otherwise boring bucket would make sense
(i.e. would be consistent with common ground, relevance, and newness) if it is the
case that he intends that I know where the reward is’’ (ibid).2 This abductive socially
recursive inference enables already human infants to comprehend the experi-
menter’s pointing in the object-choice task and find the sought-after object,
Tomasello claims. He holds that in the task, in ‘‘human cooperative communica-
tion’’ in general, individuals ‘‘must’’ engage in such inferences (2014: 59).
Suppose that early humans were indeed, as Tomasello suggests, forced to
cooperatively communicate. If subjects need to engage in socially recursive
thinking in order to cooperatively communicate (e.g. in the object-choice task), then
Tomasello’s proposal that such thinking evolved in early humans for enabling
cooperative communication seems plausible.
1 The italics in the quotes of this paper are original.
2 The reasoning from a general principle to what another subject intends that Tomasello here takes to be
‘‘required in all cases’’ in which subjects work out what someone else wants them to know seems to
suggest that he advocates a theory–theory view of social cognition. In other places in the book, however,
his use of the term ‘simulation’ suggests he favors a simulationist account (see also Tomasello 1999: 70),
or a theory-theory/simulationist hybrid. In the following discussion, not much hinges on whether he
endorses a theory-theory, simulationist, or hybrid view.
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There is, however, reason to be sceptical about the claim that socially recursive
thinking is required for this purpose. For instance, Tomasello holds that in the
object-choice task, in order to grasp the communicated message, the recipient needs
to infer that the communicator intends that she know that the sought-after object is
in the bucket. Since the recipient of the message in the developmental psychology
study that Tomasello cites is a 12-months-old infant (2014: 52), in his view, a
12-months-old infers that the adult pointing her to the bucket ‘‘intends that she
know’’ that the sought-after object is in the bucket (2014: 57).
This proposal lacks psychological plausibility, however. An understanding of the
intention that S knows that p requires the possession of some concept of knowledge
because the propositional content of the intention explicitly refers to knowledge.
Yet, there is no evidence that children acquire the concept of knowledge before the
concept of belief (Butterfill 2013), which is thought to happen at around 3–4 years
of age (Wellman et al. 2001).
Recent studies involving the violation-of-expectation paradigm and gaze tracking
do indicate that infants as young as 7–15 months are able to register other subjects’
false beliefs (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007; Kova´cs et al. 2010).
But, on the basis of further experimental results, it is widely accepted that this
early understanding of mental states is at best implicit, i.e. automatic and
unconscious in nature (see, e.g. Low and Perner 2012; Schneider et al. 2015). No
one so far claims that these infants form explicit representations of other’s mental
states, i.e. representations that figure in subject-controlled and conscious processing
(Pacherie 2013).
Since that is so, it is fair to say that the 12-months-olds in the object-choice task
also don’t engage in explicit socially recursive thinking. If they don’t do so,
however, then, against Tomasello’s claim, such thinking isn’t required for
cooperative communication. For, as he grants, these infants do engage in
cooperative communication in, e.g. the object-choice task.
Indeed, suppose that the child involved in the task makes the default assumption
that in general an adult subject S will help her achieve her goals. When she is
searching for the hidden object, and sees S point to one of the buckets, she will then
infer from S’s behaviour that the object she is currently looking for is in the pointed-
to bucket. To draw this inference, the child might simply treat S as a mindless
machine that has the function to assist her in her projects and point her to the
location of objects that she is looking for. That is, the child doesn’t need to
represent, explicitly or implicitly, any mental states, let alone engage in socially
recursive thinking in order to find what she is looking for. Similarly, if S makes the
default assumption that making eye contact with the child and then pointing to an
object will help her find the object, then S will be able to successfully communicate
to her where the object is without any kind of meta-representational processing.
Neither the infant nor S needs to engage in such processing to cooperatively
communicate.
Furthermore, even if subjects had to start, e.g. implicit socially recursive thinking
in order to cooperatively communicate, this still wouldn’t help Tomasello with his
project in A Natural History of Human Thinking, for the socially recursive thinking
whose evolutionary origin he wishes to explain requires explicit representations of
Human thinking, shared intentionality, and egocentric… 305
123
mental states. It requires explicit representations because, as mentioned above, for
Tomasello, instances of ‘‘thinking’’, including socially recursive thinking, are
‘‘system 2 processes’’ (2014 4). And system 2 processes are in Kahneman’s (2011)
dual-system account, which Tomasello endorses (2014: 4), explicit, subject-
controlled and conscious in nature.3
Finally, since Tomasello’s avowed focus is on system 2, i.e. explicit thinking, his
proposal that socially recursive thinking evolved because it is required for
cooperative communication becomes also questionable from a phenomenological
point of view. For it is often noted in the literature on social cognition that if the
inferences involved in producing mental state attributions were ‘‘explicit, they
should show up in our experience’’, but ‘‘they rarely do’’ (Gallagher and Hutto
2008: 18). Typically, in social interactions, including cooperative communication,
we aren’t aware of any mental states or inferences about what others or we intend or
think. Whatever meta-representational processing might be involved, it clearly
doesn’t need to be conscious but normally remains unconscious (Apperly 2010).
There is no reason to believe that things were any different in early humans. That
is, early humans too will presumably have been able to engage in cooperative
communication without explicit, conscious meta-representational processing. But if
that is so, then Tomasello’s claim that ‘‘human cooperative communication is
evolutionarily new’’ in that individuals ‘‘must think […] about their communicative
partner thinking […] about their thinking [emphasis added]’’ (2014: 59), where
thinking is understood as a ‘‘system 2 process’’ (2014: 4), is false.4
3 This point also holds with respect to the following proposal that Tomasello mentioned in personal
communication. He writes:
in their cooperative communication human infants are not tracking others beliefs (or knowledge
based on beliefs) but merely what others have perceived and so are familiar with. The studies by
Moll and Liebal that I cite show infants’ amazing ability to keep track of what they have
experienced with specific other individuals and what they have not, and it is this—functionally
equivalent to [the] implicit [mental state] understanding [infants exhibit in violation-of expectation
tasks]—that infants are using at the early stages.
If infants’ ability to keep track of what others have experienced is implicit or ‘functionally equivalent’
to implicit processing about mental states, then the data Tomasello mentions yield little support for claims
about S2, i.e., explicit, conscious meta-representational thinking and its evolution. That is, the data lend
little support to his project. If, alternatively, one wishes to claim that this ability involves in fact explicit
meta-representational processing, then further arguments or, better, evidence are needed than those that
Tomasello provides in his book.
4 In his discussion of collective intentionality, Tomasello offers a second proposal on why conscious
meta-representational thinking evolved. He holds that in discourse, to be a good collaborator, one often
needs to provide others with an insight into one’s own propositional attitudes toward the contents that one
communicates. Tomasello suggests that this requires making one’s attitudes explicit in language, which in
turn only works if one can consciously think about them first (2014: 102f, 117, 139). However, there is
reason to doubt Tomasello’s proposal, for one can often convey one’s mental states to others by
expressing (rather than reporting) them, which doesn’t require meta-representations of them to be
conscious, see Rosenthal (2012).
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Socially recursive inferences and egocentric biases
There is another reason for being sceptical about Tomasello’s proposal even if we
ignore the distinction between implicit and explicit thinking. It relates to a particular
kind of bias in communication. I will say a bit more about the bias first before
returning to Tomasello’s view.
A number of studies show that in communication interactants tend to exhibit an
‘‘egocentric bias’’: they have the tendency to take their own perspective to be
automatically shared by the other (see, e.g. Nickerson 1999; Royzman et al. 2003;
Epley et al. 2004; Keysar 2007; Birch and Bloom 2007; Lin et al. 2010; Apperly
et al. 2010). Interestingly, this effect is particularly pronounced in interactions with
close others.
For example, Savitsky et al. (2011) investigated whether listeners are more
egocentric in communication with a friend than a stranger. They used a task in
which a ‘director’ gives an addressee instruction to move items in an array, some of
which are only seen by the addressee but not by the director. So, for instance, the
director might tell the addressee to ‘move the mouse’—referring to a mutually
visible computer mouse –, and to comply, the addressee then has to exclude a toy
mouse that she can see but that she knows that the director can’t see. Savitsky et al.
found that subjects who were given directions by a friend made more egocentric
mistakes, i.e. they looked at and reached for an object only they could see, than
those who followed directions provided by a stranger.
Similarly, in a second study, subjects who tried to convey particular ‘‘meanings
with ambiguous phrases overestimated their success more when communicating with
a friend or spouse than with strangers’’ (Savitsky et al. 2011: 69). These results
suggest that subjects engage in ‘‘active monitoring of strangers’ divergent
perspectives because they know they must, but […] they ‘let down their guard’
and rely more on their own perspective when they communicate with a friend’’ (ibid).
These findings5 challenge Tomasello’s proposal. On his view, there was a trend
toward and selection of perspective taking and socially recursive thinking when early
humans became interdependent, cooperative, and lived in ‘‘small-scale’’ groups in
which each one knew the other (2014: 82f). Yet, the data suggest that perspective
taking and socially recursive thinking in fact decrease in interactions with cooperative
people with whom one is familiar and interdependent, e.g. spouses and friends, rather
than strangers. In these situations, subjects seem to take their own perspective to be
automatically shared by the other, and there is a trend away from perspective taking.
Prima facie, this is puzzling, for an egocentric bias threatens cooperative
communication and increases the potential for miscommunication. Why do subjects
nonetheless exhibit such a bias especially when interacting with close others?
The following proposal seems plausible. When interactants share the same
environment and jointly attend to the same thing, what is accessible and salient to
the communicator will usually be equally accessible and salient to the recipient. As
5 There is more evidence for the point that egocentrism is stronger in interactions with close others,
leading inter alia to a felt transparency of one’s own mind to them; see, e.g., Vorauer and Cameron
(2002), and Cameron and Vorauer (2008).
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a result, in these situations, an egocentric approach will support successful
communication without requiring communicators and recipients to model each
other’s perspective or mental states (Pickering and Garrod 2004; Barr and Keysar
2005; Lin et al. 2010). Recipients of a message can then anchor interpretation in
their own perspective, and, if need be (e.g. in the case of a misunderstanding),
employ information about the communicator’s perspective to incrementally adjust
away from the anchor (Nickerson 1999; Epley and Gilovich 2001; Epley et al. 2004;
Tamir and Mitchell 2013).
Does the recipient’s subsequent adjustment to the perspective of the commu-
nicator rely on representing his perspective?
It is well known that simultaneously forming and entertaining distinct mental
models is difficult (see, e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983; Pickering and Garrod 2004).
Perhaps a more realistic proposal is thus that in cooperative communication, subjects
‘‘externalise’’ computations about each other’s perspective and thinking (Pickering
and Garrod 2004: 12, 21). That is, even though communicator and recipient could
directly compute each other’s perspective, in cooperative groups, they both will
receive plenty of feedback from each other on their performance. This will allow
them to update their semantic representations on the basis of individual successes or
failures to convey and comprehend messages without having to compute each other’s
perspectives and knowledge states themselves. Social feedback mechanisms thus
allow the interactants to ‘off-load’ cognitive work, i.e. computations pertaining to
each other’s perspective, onto their social environment (Young 1998; Barr 2004).
There is evidence that such an externalisation of computations does indeed occur.
Studies show, for instance, that listeners often ask speakers to clarify the reference
of a term despite the fact that if they adopted the speaker’s perspective, they would
find that their mutual knowledge uniquely defines the referent (Keysar et al. 2000;
Keysar 2007). That is, ‘‘even when addressees are presented with clear cues to what
is mutually known, they often opt to resolve ambiguity by engaging in an epistemic
exchange [e.g. asking clarification questions and providing feedback] rather than
computing the referent themselves’’ (Barr and Keysar 2005: 33).
Note that once the referent has been fixed interactively, and a precedent has been
set, the subsequent use and comprehension of the communicative act won’t require
mutual perspective taking or socially recursive thinking either. For interactants may
then on each occasion refer back to the precedent.
Empirical work supports this view. Studies show, for instance, that listeners tend
to interpret a referential expression according to naming precedents set by a
previous speaker even when they are aware that the current speaker was not in fact
present at the time when the precedents were established (Barr and Keysar 2002;
Malt and Sloman 2004). In these cases, with anyone who was, just as the listener,
present when the precedent was set, the listener will subsequently be able to
successfully cooperatively communicate about the referent at issue without socially
recursive thinking and perspective taking. The data hence speak against
Tomasello’s view that in cooperative communication subjects ‘‘must’’ adopt the
other’s perspective (2014: 59).
More generally, given the way Tomasello characterises early humans’ social life,
one would expect that particularly the kind of early humans that he envisages
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externalised computations about each other’s mental states and exploited the
feedback mechanism involved in their interactions. For, as noted, he holds that early
humans lived in ‘‘small’’ groups and were ‘‘interdependent with one another in an
especially urgent way’’ (2014: 137). Further, early humans were cooperative,
assumed that the other too ‘‘had cooperative motives’’, and were ‘‘each trying to
help the other’’ to achieve the ‘‘joint goal of recipient comprehension’’ (Tomasello
2014: 73).
Now, in social interactions in which participants are interdependent, mutually
assume that the other is cooperative, and mutually make an effort to ensure
communicative success, communicators will evidently refrain from ambiguous and
deceptive communicative acts. Furthermore, they will aim to make information
transmission as efficient as possible, because this will, given their interdependence,
benefit both interactants. Since perspective taking and thinking about thinking are
computationally complex and cognitively effortful processes for both parties
(Apperly et al. 2006; Epley and Caruso 2009; Lin et al. 2010), and since in
cooperative communication interactive feedback tends to lead to effectively the
same result without requiring the computational complexity and effort (Young
1998; Pickering and Garrod 2004; Barr 2004), one would expect that the early
humans that Tomasello has in mind relied on each other’s feedback rather than
socially recursive inferences in order to settle the meaning of communicative acts
and ensure communicative success.
Unlike Tomasello’s view, this proposal manages to accommodate the data on a
stronger egocentrism in cooperative communication with close others. For, assuming
that Tomasello is right about his characterisation of early humans’ social environments,
then due to the interdependence of early humans and the small size of the groups in
which they lived, early human communicators and recipientswill have received copious
feedback from each other on their performance. These aspects of early humans’ social
environments will have allowed early humans to be more egocentric and assume by
default that close others share their own perspective. Since an egocentric bias will for
them also have made their cognitive processing in cooperative communication with
close others computationally more economical and tractable, it seems likely that this is
why the bias evolved and is still present in contemporary humans.
In sum, then, the preceding points suggest that cooperative communication
doesn’t necessarily require simulating what the other is thinking about one’s own
thinking. They cast doubts on Tomasello’s proposal that socially recursive thinking
evolved in groups of highly interdependent and cooperative individuals for enabling
cooperative communication. It is more probable that the early humans that he
considers evolved the disposition to anchor their interpretation of each other’s
communicative acts onto their own egocentric perspective6 and then, in the case of a
6 Goldman (2006) holds that when S exhibits an egocentric bias, this is the result of a ‘‘quarantine
failure’’: in the simulation process, the subject fails to isolate her own perspective from that of the other,
and so the former seeps into the latter (165). That is, on his view, when S is in communication
egocentrically biased, then she still engages in perspective taking or simulation. However, note that even
Goldman acknowledges that such a case is a ‘‘limiting case’’ of simulation in which ‘‘the simulation
element is null’’ (41). Given this, there is no reason to accept that simulation takes place at all, rather than
a direct attribution, see also Wallin (2011).
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misunderstanding, adjusted away from it, off-loading meta-representational pro-
cessing pertaining to each other’s perspective onto their social interactions. Since
early humans arguably did not need to simulate the other’s thinking about their own
thinking to cooperatively communicate, and since there is empirical evidence that
cooperative communication can proceed without perspective taking (Barr and
Keysar 2002; Malt and Sloman 2004), Tomasello’s proposal about the evolution of
socially recursive thinking can be rejected.7
But why then did socially recursive thinking evolve? While this isn’t the place
for a detailed answer, the early development of meta-representational capacities in
infants, who aren’t typically confronted with uncooperative interactants, suggests
that these capacities, including socially recursive thinking, evolved not so much for
enabling cooperative communication, as Tomasello suggest, but rather for allowing
infants to deal with another pressing problem they face, namely social learning.8
Social learning frequently requires that the learner ‘‘understand that a perfor-
mance is stylised, that a crucial step has been slowed down, exaggerated, or
repeated to make it more overt’’ (Sterelny 2012: 146). To ensure reliable knowledge
transmission and acquisition, both the learner and the teacher ‘‘need to read each
other’’ in that each ‘‘monitors the other and their joint focus of attention and
intention’’ (ibid). That is, both need to engage in mutual perspective taking and
socially recursive thinking. Given the important role of social learning in human
infants, there is good reason to assume that socially recursive thinking evolved as an
adaptation for it.
Conclusion
Tomasello’s new book A Natural History of Human Thinking makes a plausible
case for the view that the apparent uniqueness of our thinking is ultimately grounded
in our species-specific dispositions and abilities to engage in collaboration and
cooperative communication with each other. His overall argument would have
benefitted if attention had been paid to the distinction between explicit and implicit
thinking, and if the data on egocentric biases in communication had been
considered. Having said that, Tomasello’s ideas on what makes human thought
unique and what explains its origin are intriguing and likely to shape future debates
on theses issues.9
7 It is worth noting that there are various ways in which cooperative communication might appear to rely
on perspective taking even though no perspective-taking abilities but other processes are involved, see,
e.g., Barr (2014) for an interesting discussion and a list of ‘‘impostors’’ of perspective taking.
8 Tomasello (1999) himself proposes that socially recursive thinking evolved for social learning.
Curiously, in A Natural History of Human Thinking, he doesn’t consider the view.
9 I would like to thank Nick Shea, Kim Sterelny, and Michael Tomasello for very helpful comments and
clarifications on a previous draft of the paper.
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